It has been argued that the opaqueness of structured bonds such as Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), and Collateral Debt Obligations (CDOs) was one of the major causes of the recent financial crisis that started in late 2007. In this article, we analyze the evolving nature of the opaqueness of structured bonds by examining U.S. insurers' assets from a capital markets perspective. We show that, before 2005, the market did not view structured bonds as opaque investments; however, after 2005, the market began to perceive multi-class structured bonds, especially private bonds, as opaque assets. In addition, by investigating the rating grades of such structured bonds, we find that the market views lower-grade, private, multiclass structured bonds as the most opaque assets. Additionally, publicly traded multi-class structured bonds with superior ratings are also considered opaque. This result provides a useful foundation for the reform of credit rating agencies.
Introduction
The burst of the latest real estate market bubble in 2007 soon turned into a liquidity and credit crisis in financial markets. Many papers point out that one of the most important factors that caused the crisis was the opaqueness of structured bonds, such as Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), and Collateral Debt Obligations (CDOs) (e.g., Dionne, 2009; Harrington, 2009; Scott and Taylor, 2009; Caprio, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Kane, 2010; Ryan, 2008 ). Yet, little research has been done to empirically investigate such products and understand the nature of their opaqueness. Previous literature, such as Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004) and Zhang, Cox and Van Ness (2009) , investigates the opaqueness of banking firms' assets and the opaqueness of asset portfolios and underwriting liabilities of insurance companies.
However, these papers do not distinguish structured bonds from other corporate bonds and government bonds in their analyses.
The insurance industry, as an important sector of the financial services industry, has been a big investor in structured bonds (Liebenberg, Colquitt, and Hollans, 2010; IMF, 2008; Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda, 2010) . Some big insurance companies even fell into financial trouble because of heavy investment in such bonds. 1 The lack of empirical research on the opaqueness of structured bonds, the importance of structured bonds for insurance firms, and the rich data available for the U.S. insurance industry have prompted us to examine the opaqueness of structured bonds in this article, which extends the existing literature to provide empirical evidence of the opaqueness of structured products.
The volume of literature on analyzing the causes and consequences of the [2007] [2008] financial crisis has been rapidly growing. One such cause, the declining value of subprime mortgage-related assets, was the apparent trigger for the recent financial turmoil. Therefore, one side of the current literature discusses why the proportion of subprime mortgages rapidly increased, why the delinquencies of mortgages rose, why financial institutions securitized mortgages, why there were high demands for the structured bonds, and so forth (e.g., Wilmarth, 2009; Krohn and Gruver, 2008; Coleman, LaCour-Little, and Vandell, 2008) . These papers usually point out the lax underwriting standards; a long-lasting, low interest rate in the 2000s;
competitive pressure for high yields; errors made by rating agencies in risk modeling; and greedy participants in the financial market as the causes of the rapidly grown mortgage-backed securities, along with other changing institutional, political, and regulatory environments after the early 2000s.
The other side of the literature investigates how the relatively small size of subprime mortgages losses can be amplified into a worldwide financial crisis (e.g., Murphy, 2008; Hellwig, 2009; Schwarcz, 2009 ). The estimated loss in subprime mortgage-backed-securities was about $500 billion dollars, which is smaller than the technology bubble loss in 2000 (Hellwig, 2009 ).
These papers argue that lost credibility in the structure process (notably the credibility of rating agencies), financial institutions' high leverage, and opaqueness of the structure process are the causes of this amplification. This raises an empirical question of how opaque these structured products are to the market. Does the market take into consideration the opaqueness of such assets when valuing a firm? So far, systematic empirical research on these questions has been lacking.
In the past decade, the growing popularity of securitizing and structuring mortgagerelated products has allowed mortgage originators to share and transfer the housing price and credit risk among various investors: banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, mutual funds, and pension funds. However, the spreading and sharing of risks have been done in very complex and opaque ways. There are two related but different transparency issues. One is the opaqueness of off-balance sheet securitization, which makes the issuers opaque, and the other is the opaqueness of structured bonds, which makes the investors opaque.
Assessing the risks of issuers is particularly difficult because many use off-balance sheet entities. Risks are technically transferred through quasi-separated conduits and Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs). However, since the issuers are still responsible for the liquidity risk of off-balance sheet entities, the risks are not completely transferred. In reality, the degree of risk retention is continuous from complete risk transfer to almost full risk retention, and the information on the degree of risk retention is not fully disclosed. 2 Cheng, Dhaliwal, and Neamtiu (2010) test the opaqueness of securitization to the issuers and find that off-balance sheet securitization increases the opaqueness of the issuers.
The other source of opaqueness of structured bonds is the opaqueness of the structured bond itself. The nature of the structure process, such as pooling, structuring, and re-structuring, makes it extremely difficult to track the impact of mortgage loan losses on the losses of final structured products. It becomes even harder to estimate the increased risks when structured bonds are part of the underlying assets of other structured bonds such as CDOs. Furthermore, the most complicated CDOs are only sold through private placements, where only registered investors can 2 There are two financial reporting techniques for securitization: sales (off-balance sheet) and secured borrowing (on-balance sheet). When a firm uses the off-balance sheet technique, the balance sheet of the issuers does not fully disclose the recourse obligation, servicing requirements, and, of course, the implicit responsibility arising from reputation management.
review the details of the deal. 3 As a result, investment in such assets tends to increase the opaqueness of a firm to investors.
Dealing with the opaqueness of structured bonds has become a focus of insurance regulation alternative methodologies for assessing structured security risks and reducing regulators' reliance on credit ratings, which the group views to be less than reliable for various reasons. Additionally, the group recommends the development of standards, greater standardization of definitions, greater consistency in the agreements used for structured securities, and so forth (McRaith et al., 2010) .
Given the importance of structured bonds in insurance companies' solvency and performance, it is important to investigate several matters: how opaque the structured bonds are to insurance companies' investors; when the market begins to view such investments as opaque assets; what kind of structured bonds make insurance companies' balance sheets more opaque and risky; and whether credit rating can adequately reduce the opaqueness of such products. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to empirically address the opaqueness of different types of structured bonds in insurance companies' assets, as well as their impacts on the valuation of these companies.
We explore the opaqueness of structured bonds by using data from the insurance industry for several reasons. First, we can better estimate the opaqueness of structured bonds by using homogenous insurance companies without being contaminated by cross-industry effects. For instance, banks are both investors and issuers of structured bonds. Therefore, both the opaqueness of off-balance sheet securitization and the opaqueness of the product itself exist.
Hedge funds and investment banks are unregulated; therefore, they tend to hold riskier tranches of structured bonds than insurers. This systemic difference among financial institutions may create noise in empirical estimations. Insurers, on the other hand, are mostly involved in structured bond transactions as investors and not as originators. As a result, we can estimate more accurately the pure opaqueness of the structured bonds themselves without dramatic contamination from opaque off-balance sheet financial reporting. Secondly, insurance companies are traditionally one of the largest investors of mortgagebacked securities, along with pension funds, hedge funds, and banks (IMF, 2008; Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda, 2010) . The long duration of insurers' liability and the relatively long terms of mortgage-backed securities make insurers the ideal investors for mortgage-backed securities.
Furthermore, AAA-and AA-rated bonds with higher yields than other corporate bonds or T-bills are very attractive options to insurers whose investment options are limited and strictly regulated by the NAIC. As a result, studying the opaqueness of structured bonds will provide practical reference for insurance regulators, customers and investors.
Lastly, insurance companies are a homogenous group in terms of financial reporting. All insurance companies need to report to the NAIC. The reported structured bonds-related data is therefore standardized and more detailed. The standardized NAIC database provides holding information on publicly traded and privately placed single-class and multi-class structured bonds.
In addition, it provides rating information for multi-class structured bonds, which enables us to conduct further analysis of the effectiveness of rating on reducing the opaqueness of such products.
In this paper, we first examine the amount of structured bonds held by insurance companies during the ten-year period from 1998 to 2008. Secondly, we investigate whether structured bonds are opaque to evaluate for investors by using a sample of publicly traded life-health (L/H) and property-casualty (P/C) insurance companies. Specifically we explore the effects of structured bond holdings on the bid-ask spread and analysts' earnings forecast dispersion by controlling for The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the complexity of structured bonds and structured bond holdings in insurers' assets. We then describe our data and methodology, followed by presenting the empirical results. The last section concludes the paper.
Structured Bonds
"Structured" finance generally refers to financial products created by pooling various underlying risks (such as mortgage loans or auto loans) and slicing them into different "tranches," a French Securitization, then, has evolved into a more creative way of structuring. Issuers slice the pools into several-at least three-subordinated tranches with different risks. The highest quality tranche, the senior tranche with the AAA rating, gets the lowest return. The next tranche, at the mezzanine level, is usually rated A-to BBB, and the rest is equity tranche (or "toxic waste"), which is non-rated. The cash flows from underlying assets first pay off the senior level, then the mezzanine, and so on. With this structure, the equity level absorbs most of the losses.
Structured bonds are not standardized. Some are structured by default risks, while others are structured by prepayment risks. Furthermore, tranches often include more sophisticated features such as interest-only strips and principal-only strips. RMBS are backed by residential mortgage loans, and CMBS are backed by commercial property mortgage loans. Similarly, the underlying assets of ABS may consist of auto loans, credit card loans, student loans, equipment loans, etc.
Issuers sell the senior tranche to buyers, and then recycle the less popular mezzanine and equity tranches by using them as underlying assets for other structured bonds called CDOs.
Unlike MBS, CDOs pool various risks, including mortgages, corporate bonds, auto loans, credit card loans, and other structured bonds. By pooling risks that are considered to be not highly correlated and by adding credit default swap (CDS) or bond insurance on top of them, the risks of CDOs-which consist of bad-quality underlying assets-are considered to be significantly lowered. As a result, the default probabilities of CDOs were considered fairly low.
( Mason and Rosner, 2007) . CDOs, the most complex structured bonds, are only sold through private placement with confidentiality. The process does not stop there. The mezzanine and equity trenches of CDOs are again sold and repackaged to make CDO-squared. the total MBS outstanding; the number grew to 1.6 trillion dollars in 2007, which was 25 percent of the total MBS outstanding (Gorton, 2009) . What is even worse is that these toxic assets were first securitized as MBS, and then some of them flooded into the most complex CDOs. UBS Bank examined 420 CDOs that had structured bonds as collaterals and found that 83 percent of the residential MBS in CDOs were subprime and Alt-A (Gorton, 2009). 6 With the fanatic pace of growth and the complexity of structuring, the most sophisticated rating agencies are the only ones left that could potentially or still attempted to estimate the risk of structured bonds. As a result, the investors of such products relied more than ever on bond ratings, rather than trying to understand the risk of underlying assets. Institutions that held structured bonds also used the rating information to value their assets. Unfortunately, even the most sophisticated rating agencies failed to catch up with the winds of change and provide quality estimation of the risks. In fact, the close relationship between credit rating agencies and Wall Street bond issuers may have led them to engineer the risks of the highest senior tranche right above the AAA boundary line, making the portfolio less resistant than expected to the default risk of underlying assets. The series of rating downgrades during the 2008-2009 period has raised questions about the credibility of rating agencies. Many pointed out that the market's dependency on rating agencies and these agencies' seriously undermined credibility contributed to the prolonged financial crisis (Caprio, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Kane, 2010) . As a result, the newly enacted Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010 imposed new requirements and oversights on credit rating agencies. This phenomenon also makes it interesting to test if the market fully trusts the rating grades of structured bonds provided by such agencies, a test which should shed some light on the necessity of rating agency reform.
Structured Bonds in Insurers' Assets and Hypotheses Tested
Insurance companies, especially life insurance companies, are traditionally major purchasers of MBS. Long-term bonds are a good match for the long-term liabilities of life insurance companies.
Although there are prepayment risks, the most common type of residential mortgage loan is a 30-year loan. Accordingly, typical MBS also has long maturity on average.
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In addition, a period of record low interest rates following a high-interest rate period presents a big challenge for life insurance companies, because the guaranteed rate of return for insurance products (made at the time when interest rate was high), such as permanent life insurance products and annuities, is higher than the actual interest rate. The low interest rate, combined with extended life expectancy, increases insurers' demand for investment products with higher yields. Structured bonds provide higher yields than other corporate bonds or treasury bonds but still have the same AAA ratings, which technically do not increase the amount of risk-based capital of an insurance company. Vink and Thibeault (2008) , the average MBS matures in just over 27.7 years. They use non-U.S. MBS data only. 8 The typical coupon rate for AAA-rated CDOs is about LIBOR+26 bps, LIBOR+75 bps for A-rated CDOs, LIBOR+180 for BBB-rated CDOs, and LIBOR+475 for BB-rated CDOs (Lucas, Goodman and Fabozzi, 2006 The percentage of property-liability insurers that hold structured bonds is not as high as that of life-health insurers and shows no sign of increase over time. For P/C insurers with structured bond investments, the median percentage of structured bond holdings to total assets stably increases over time. The percentage reached more than six percent during the 2005-2008 period for both single-class and multi-class bonds.
In sum, life-health insurance companies hold more structured bonds than property-casualty insurance companies do in terms of both absolute amount and percentage of assets, which is consistent with the asset-liability duration-matching incentive of life insurers.
The apparent downside for insurance company investment in structured bonds is the complexity and opaqueness of such bonds. The complicated nature of structured products makes it very difficult for insurers to understand and value them. Although a higher yield with the NAIC-1 rating is very attractive, some insurers could be reluctant to take this option because they are not capable of understanding these products and risks associated with them. This argument is consistent with that of Liebenberg, Colquitt, and Hollans (2010) , who find that a significant number of insurers do not invest in RMBS at all; and Baranoff and Sager (2009) , who find that many life insurers fail to adjust capital to accommodate the increased risk of structured bonds.
The difficulty of valuing structured bonds is not limited to structured bond purchasers; it could be even more difficult for investors to value insurance companies that have structured bond holdings. Although all insurers in the U.S. report total structured bond holdings in Statutory
Annual Statements, the reported value is still opaque due to the aforementioned nature of these products. Private multi-class structured bonds are probably the most opaque to investors because they are highly structured and tailored, which makes it almost impossible for outsiders to understand their real risk by simply looking at the reported values. Borrowers and lenders negotiate the lending terms and conditions, and lenders have a right to monitor borrowers closely, but the deal information is usually not disclosed to other parties. 10 On top of that, the most complex type of multi-class structured bonds, CDOs, are only issued in over-the-counter markets.
We therefore hypothesize that holding more structured bonds, particularly privately placed multiclass bonds, increases the information gap between insurers and their investors, which increases the opaqueness of insurance firms.
As described above, insurance company investments are subject to investment guidelines from the NAIC, which restricts their investments in non-graded or risky bonds. Investments in structured bonds should also follow these same rules. The NAIC used to rely on credit ratings from rating agencies for publicly traded bonds and apply their own risk ratings for privately placed bonds (Kwan and Carleton, 2004) 11 . Given the proposed change by the NAIC about using credit ratings for structured bonds after the financial crisis, it will be interesting to investigate whether the existing rating system provides useful information to the market. As such, we examine the opaqueness of structured bonds that are NAIC-1 rated and those that are rated NAIC-2 and below. We predict that if the market believes in the credit ratings, then structured bonds (public or private) with an NAIC-1 rating will be less opaque, while those with below an NAIC-1 rating will add opaqueness to insurance stocks. However, if the market has less confidence in the public rating agencies, the publicly traded NAIC-1 rating bonds will not be as transparent to the market as their ratings indicate.
Data and Methodology

Data and Sample Selection
The sample studied in this paper includes publicly traded U.S. insurers. We collect firms' structured bonds data and other financial information primarily from the NAIC database because only limited information is available from COMPUSTAT as compared to the NAIC. Our study is at the group and unaffiliated single firm level. We consolidate a firm's property-casualty and life-health operations by group code. To guarantee that our sample is restricted to insurance firms only, we exclude companies whose consolidated total assets from the NAIC is less than 50 percent of COMPUSTAT's total assets. The final sample includes 205 firms with 1134 firm-years of data.
We extract data on bid-ask spread, stock price, trading volume, and stock returns from CRSP.
We also use the I/B/E/S database to obtain the number of analysts and dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts.
Opaqueness Measures
The first opaqueness measure used in this study is the bid-ask spread. Numerous market microstructure studies provide theoretical and empirical evidence that one rationale for the existence of bid-ask spreads is information asymmetry in the stock market (Bagehot, 1971; Kyle, 1985; and Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) . It is argued that market makers post the bid (the price at which a stock can be sold) and ask prices (the price at which a stock can be bought) in such a 12 COMPUSTAT and CRSP have slightly different SIC code records. When either COMPUSTAT or CRSP does not report an insurance SIC code, we check business information manually from the 10-K report available in the SEC's EDGAR database for that year.
way that the expected profit from trades can be zero, despite the fact that informed traders buy or sell stocks only if the trading is profitable for them. In other words, the market maker, who generally cannot distinguish between informed traders and uninformed traders, recovers losses incurred in trades with informed traders through gains in trades with uninformed traders by maintaining the bid-ask spreads. As a result, stocks with higher levels of information asymmetry should have bigger bid-ask spreads.
The relative opaqueness of assets and liabilities of financial institutions has been shown to affect bid-ask spreads in the stock market. Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004) 
Structured Bond Variables
Schedule D, Part 1A Section 2 of the NAIC annual statement provides the aggregate value of publicly and privately traded bonds and their breakdown to non-structured bonds, single-class structured bonds, and multi-class structured bonds. Our primary interest is in the opaqueness of private and public multi-class structured bonds, which consists of RMBS, CMBS, ABS, and
CDOs. The statement also provides the credit rating information of such bonds, which enables us to test whether the damaged credibility of rating agencies increases the opaqueness of rated structured products over time.
Methodology
We run the fixed effects panel regression to examine the opaqueness of structured bonds in insurers' assets. A robust regression method is adopted to accommodate the appearance of outliers and non-normality issues of data. 13 We run separate analyses for the period of 1998-2004, 13 Robust regression method uses an iteratively reweighted least squares estimation method. It assigns higher weights to better-behaved observations and can drop extreme cases, e.g., those with Cook's D greater than 1, from the regression. This method can achieve the efficiency of OLS with ideal data and performs substantially better than OLS in non-ideal situations (e.g., data with non-normal errors or outliers) (Hamilton, 2003 PUBSINGLE = the ratio of total publicly traded, single-class structured bonds to total assets PRISINGLE = the ratio of total privately placed, single-class structured bonds to total assets PUBMULTI = the ratio of total publicly traded, multi-class structured bonds to total assets PRIMULTI = the ratio of total privately placed, multi-class structured bonds to total assets OOPAQUE = the ratio of investment in mortgage, real estate, and non-structured private bonds to total assets PCOPA = the ratio of premiums in long-tail lines, mortgage guarantees, financial guarantees, and credit lines to total premiums LHOPA = the ratio of premiums in individual life, individual annuity, and credit life to total premiums FINHOLD = a dummy variable equal to one if an insurer is a financial holding company and zero otherwise.
14 LASSET = log of total assets LEVER = debt to asset ratio GROWTH = log of (market value of equity + book value of debt)/book value of asset 14 Following Egginton et al. (2010) , we identify financial holding companies by using the COMPUSTAT segment database and firm 10-K reports. We consider an insurance company a financial holding company if the firm reports any non-insurance financial services segments, such as Asset Management, Financial Products, Investment Management, and Financial Services (with SIC 62XX or NAICS 523XXX). If such information is not available, we refer to a firm's 10-K reports to identify whether the firm has non-insurance financial services business. LANAL = log(1+number of analysts following stock i during year t) LSTD = log of daily stock return standard deviation LPRC = log of closing stock price at the end of the year LVOL = log of average daily trading volume
In the regression testing of whether or not the market perceives the differences of opaqueness in multi-class structured bonds with different ratings, we split PUBMULTI into PUBMULTID and PUBMULTIO, and split PRIMULTI into PRIMULTID and PRIMULTIO, where PUBMULTID = the ratio of NAIC-1 graded publicly traded multi-class structured bonds to total assets PUBMULTIO = the ratio of NAIC-2 and lower grade publicly traded multi-class structured bonds to total assets PRIMULTID = the ratio of NAIC-1 graded privately placed multi-class structured bonds to total assets PRIMULTID = the ratio of NAIC-2 and lower grade privately placed multi-class structured bonds to total assets
The dependent variables of the regressions are the opaqueness measures of insurance firms; that is, the average of quoted bid-ask spread and the dispersion in the analysts' earnings forecast are used as dependent variables.
The key independent variables are the four structured bond holdings variables:
PUBSINGLE, PRISINGLE, PUBMULTI, and PRIMULTI. We expect PRIMULTI, the percentage of private multi-class structured bond holdings to total assets, to be strongly positively associated with the opaqueness of the insurance company. We expect that PUBMULTI, the percentage of publicly traded multi-class structured bond holdings to total assets, to have a relationship that is not as strong as PRIMULTI but still positive. PUBSINGLE and PRISINGLE are the proportion of public and private pass-throughs. Pass-throughs are also securitized assets, but the risk of their underlying assets is passed through to the final investor, the insurance company; therefore, we do not expect pass-throughs to be more opaque than most of the other assets of the insurance company. PRISINGLE could add opaqueness to an insurer's assets because private bonds, a type of investment analogous to bank loans, can be opaque by nature. It is difficult for public market investors to evaluate borrowers in private placement markets due to information asymmetry, and the deal value is usually too small to secure a public offering. Borrowers and lenders negotiate the lending terms and conditions, but the information is not available to public investors (Cummins, Phillips, and Smith, 2001; Kwan and Carleton, 2004 ).
The remaining independent variables control for other opaque asset and liability factors, firm characteristics, and market microstructure variables that might be associated with a firm's opaqueness, as shown in the existing literature. We first control for other types of opaque assets of insurance companies (OOPAQUE). Traditionally, investment in mortgage loans and real estate are considered opaque assets of insurance firms, but no empirical evidence shows that such assets add opaqueness to insurance companies (Zhang, Cox, and Van Ness, 2009 ). Bonds used to be viewed as transparent assets of insurance firms; however, as argued in previous sections, structured bonds, by the nature of their design, are very opaque to the investors, and non-structured private bonds, by the nature of their transactions, could be considered opaque as well. As a result, after singling out the structured bonds, we combine investments in mortgage loans, real estate, and non-structured private bonds as other opaque assets. We do not have strong predictions regarding this variable, since existing literature does not find that these assets are actually opaque. We generally follow Zhang, Cox, and Van Ness (2009) and Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004) for other control variables. Both the analysts' forecast dispersion and the bid-ask spreads are affected by a company's uncertainty, so we control the standard deviation of stock returns in the model. The number of analysts is controlled because more analysts may reduce the opaqueness. Finally, market microstructure literature reports evidence that trading volume and price are correlated with bid-ask spreads, so we include average trading volume and stock price in the regression. We also control for firm characteristics such as size, debt-to-asset ratio, and market-to-book ratio.
The structured bonds became more complex and became toxic assets when subprime mortgages flooded into the market in recent years. Therefore, we run separate regressions for the periods of 1998-2004 and 2005-2008 in order to examine the increased opaqueness of structured bonds over time.
Empirical Results
Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics for our sample of publicly traded insurance companies. The quoted bid-ask spread in our sample is 1.27 percent on average. Analysts' earnings forecast dispersion is 0.05 on average. The number of observation of dispersion is smaller than that of the quoted spread because only insurers with at least two analysts are included in the sample.
On the asset side, on average, about 14 percent of insurers' assets are structured bonds, and they are mostly publicly traded. Publicly traded multi-class bonds with an NAIC-1 rating (PUBMULTID), on average, account for 5.68 percent of insurers' assets. The privately traded multi-class structured bonds (PRIMULTI), which are expected to be the most complicated and opaque, on average account for 0.48 percent of insurers' assets, and within this category, about 67 percent have an NAIC-2 to -6 rating (PRIMULTIO) (which accounts for 0.32 percent of insurers' assets). On the liability side, about 55 percent of premiums are from long-tail lines and guarantee lines of business (PAOPA), and 14 percent are from ordinary life, credit life, and individual annuity lines of business (LHOPA). About 21 percent of our sample has a financial holding company dummy equal to one.
Regression Results
Public vs. private structured bonds Table 3 
Rating of structured bonds and their opaqueness
The NAIC provides rating information on multi-class structured bonds. In Schedule D of the NAIC annual report, both private and public multi-class structured bonds are classified into two categories: Defined MBS/ABS and Other MBS/ABS. Multi-class structured bonds rated NAIC-1 are in the Multi-Class Defined MBS/ABS category, and multi-class structured bonds rated NAIC-2 or below are in Multi-Class Other MBS/ABS category. No rating information is available for pass-through securities. In this section, we test the effects of bond rating on the opaqueness of structured bonds. We include four new variables (PUBMULTID, PUBMULTIO, PRIMULTID, and PRIMULTIO) instead of the two multi-class structured bond variables (PUBMULTI and PRIMULTI) in the regressions.
Most publicly traded bonds are rated by major rating agencies such as Moody's and S&P.
However, privately placed bonds are not rated by bond rating agencies in many cases (Kwan and Carleton, 2004) . Instead, the NAIC provides credit ratings for non-rated private bonds in insurers' assets for solvency regulation purposes. It is expected that weak credit quality bonds have higher risks and thus have positive associations with bid-ask spreads and dispersion. However, this relation may be unclear because NAIC-1 rated bonds could have the same degree of complexity, and the lost credibility of rating agencies and inflated rating grades provided by such agencies may raise investors' doubts about the quality of NAIC-1 rated bonds. As shown in Table 2 , most public multi-class structured bonds in insurance companies' assets have an NAIC-1 rating, and two-thirds of private multi-class structured bonds have ratings of NAIC-2 or lower. In this sense, it is interesting to examine how the market perceives the opaqueness of structured bonds with different ratings. The regression results are reported in Table 4 .
Private multi-class bonds with NAIC-2 ratings or lower (PRIMULTIO) are shown to be the most opaque assets in the 2005-2008 regressions. Combined with the results of Table 3 , it suggests that the opaqueness of private multi-class structured bonds primarily comes from the bonds with high default risks. Interestingly, the results for publicly traded structured bonds reveal a different relation. Public bonds with NAIC-1 ratings (PUBMULTID) increase the opaqueness of insurance companies, whereas public bonds with NAIC-2 or lower ratings (PUBMULTIO) do not have a significant relationship with firm opaqueness. This suggests that the strong ratings provided by rating agencies do not resolve information asymmetry between insurance companies and their investors on the quality of these bonds. Our results provide some evidence that public rating agencies may actually bias their ratings on structured bonds upward and that a reform of the rating agency system is in fact necessary.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to examine the opaqueness of structured bonds from a capital markets perspective by studying publicly traded insurance companies in the U.S. By concentrating on one industry, we can have a more homogeneous sample, which can provide cleaner results than cross-industry studies and is free of dramatic contamination from opaque offbalance sheet financial reporting. This article is the first empirical examination of the frequently discussed problem of structured bond opaqueness, which is considered as one of the important causes of the recent financial crisis. Methodologically, this study is an extension of previous works on the opaqueness of insurance companies by Zhang, Cox, and Van Ness (2009) and the opaqueness of bank holding companies by Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004) .
We first show that insurance companies are one of the major investors in structured bonds. We argue that the opaqueness of structured bonds in insurers' assets will cause market makers and analysts difficulty in evaluating insurance company stocks, thus increasing bid-ask spreads and analysts' earnings forecast dispersion. We hypothesize that the opaqueness of structured bonds increases as the structure becomes more complex and contains more private information. In other words, privately placed and multi-class structured bonds should be more opaque than other types of structured bonds.
The paper finds that publicly traded single-class structured bonds are rather transparent compared to other assets, multi-class structured bonds are more opaque than single-class, and privately placed multi-class structured bonds the most opaque in insurers' assets. Structured bonds are only found to be considered opaque during the 2005-2008 period, when the complexity of bonds increased and toxic assets flooded into the asset pools. This suggests that securitized assets or mortgage related assets themselves are not necessarily opaque. It is the complex structure process and insufficient disclosure of information that make these assets more opaque to investors.
Rating information on the structured bonds should reduce the opaqueness of these assets.
However, our results show that strong AAA/AA ratings from rating agencies do not close the information gap; rather, they increase this gap. In contrast, it seems that good rating information on private bonds, which usually are provided by NAIC rather than by rating agencies, reduces the opaqueness.
Overall, this paper provides strong empirical evidence that structured bonds, especially privately placed multi-class bonds, are opaque to the market and investors. In addition, the opaqueness of publicly traded multi-class structured bonds with strong ratings suggests that firms and regulators should be careful when using rating information provided by the public rating agencies in making their investment decisions, since the market and general investors may perceive the ratings differently. 
